Public broadcasting service under austerity: cross-comparison between Portugal and Spain by Silva, Elsa Costa e & Díaz-González, María-Jesús
 1 
Accepted version for International Communication Gazette, 
DOI: 10.1177/1748048520915669 
Public Broadcasting Service Under austerity:  
Cross-comparison between Portugal and Spain 
 
Elsa Costa e Silva  
Communication Sciences Department & Communication and Society Research Centre, Minho 
University, Portugal 
María-Jesús Díaz-González 
Department of Sociology and Communication Sciences, Universidade da Coruña, Spain 
 
Abstract:  
Following the global financial crisis of 2007/08, five European countries called for 
external financial assistance. Austerity policies were implemented, but the extent to 
which the bailout deal impacted the Portuguese and Spanish public service broadcasters 
has not been yet thoroughly investigated. Both born in dictatorial regimes, these public 
services broadcasters in democratic contexts followed different solutions for governance 
and funding. This article investigates the changes produced in the Portuguese and 
Spanish public media under the austerity era, analysing the policy measures 
implemented, as well as the economic and ratings performance of both public service 
broadcasters. The aim is to assess if external factors (such as external assistance) 
originated similar effects in both countries Results show that, in spite of different 
funding and governance models adopted, both public services were heavily impacted in 
 2 
terms of revenues and ratings and that the austerity period provided the context to set up 
a neoliberal ideological point-of-view.  Both public services lost legitimacy and their 
cultural and political role was undermined by a discussion that was grounded on 
economic factors alone. 
Key-words: Public Service Media; funding; governance; license fee; ratings; 
programming; austerity. 
  
 
 
Introduction 
The financial external assistance to European countries in the context of the Eurozone 
crisis, which started in 2009, severely impacted the multiple public services of the 
bailed-out countries, such as Education and Health. Having its origin in the sovereign 
debt crisis, the solution presented by the international organizations which assisted the 
countries (such as International Monetary Fund, European Commission and European 
Central Bank) insisted in public expenses’ cuts and State re-dimension (namely by 
imposing privatizations).  
This austerity framework was bond to affect media systems, but the extent to 
which the bailout deal impacted the Portuguese and Spanish public services 
(respectively RTP and RTVE) has not been yet thoroughly investigated. The Eurozone 
crisis happened in a context in which European public service media face an ongoing 
battle for legitimization and redefinition, thus bringing new challenges to public policies 
concerning the provision of public audio-visual and media content. Portugal and Spain 
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share some common political and cultural traits, which have been somehow reflected in 
the media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Both countries, forming the Iberian 
Peninsula, faced the demise of dictatorships in the 1970s’ and initiated a 
democratization process that has led to different contextual options in terms of the 
media system. However, high similarities induced by the globalized de-regulation and 
European integration can still be identified in parts of the system, such as in the radio 
sector (Arboledas and Bonet, 2013), which raises important questions on the impact of 
external factors in promoting convergent scenarios.  
This article investigates the changes produced in the Portuguese and Spanish 
public broadcasters analysing the policy measures taken in the austerity period in terms 
of its organizational architecture, namely in two critical axis: governance and funding 
models. The impact on audience ratings is also assessed and the individual findings for 
each country are then discussed with a comparative approach that aims at analysing if, 
among the different paths followed, common trends can be identified.  
 
PSM under continuous criticism 
The functions and roles of what is called today Public Service Media (PSM) have been 
a matter of normative argumentation, but they have also become a political ground for 
ideological dispute on the need to promote a social responsibility approach or to leave 
media system handed over to a free market principle. Although a prevalent reality in 
Europe, PSM faces an eroding support which can be explained by the growing (and 
sometimes very successful) commercial competition. This has led to the consequent 
sacrifice of public service distinctiveness in order to meet satisfactory audience ratings, 
to secure talent and content rights, as well as political support and financial resources 
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(d’Haenens et al., 2010; Steemers, 2003). Other reasons for the PSM’ ‘crisis’ have been 
identified in the general change of society, namely in the growing trends of 
individualisation and fragmentation.  
Globalization, convergence and neoliberal sentiments challenge PSM on a daily 
basis (Jakubowicz, 2010). Thus, although some national PSM may be presented as cases 
of some success, many others struggle hard with their institutional status regarding the 
State and other endure lack of funding stability and provision, while all are challenged 
by the dynamic changes and convergence of mediascape. A structural vector remains in 
the rationale for a PSM: the need to offer citizens some media provision that serves 
primarily the public interest and not only commercial pursuits. The idea is that the 
media sector must also be served with organizations free of undue commercial 
imperatives and political manipulation (McQuail, 2010). In the face of the digital 
transformation of media systems, PSM still plays a pivotal role to maintain quality 
programme standards, to counterweight powerful private media and to promote national 
and societal cultural identities (Jakubowicz, 2010). 
These theoretical grounds have not, however, always been reflected in the real 
functioning of public broadcasting. For the Southern countries of Europe, the 
idiosyncratic culture is bound to the idea of governmental interference, which has 
undermined the credibility and independence of PSM (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 
2002; Hanretty, 2009). But also in other parts of Europe, such as the Scandinavian 
countries, where high standards of quality and independence are seen as intrinsic to the 
system, questions of political interference have been raised (Larsen, 2016).  State 
control is thus a problematic issue, with governmental administrative board nomination 
raising concerns over the possibility of some indirect political control being exercised.  
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The distinctiveness of PSM has also been under criticism, given the growing 
commercialization of the broadcasting operations (Bardoel and D’Haenens, 2008; 
Blumler, 1993), with public service broadcasters being accused of weakening their 
remit to grow audience share. Therefore, argues Tambini (2015: 44), “while the 
audience and revenue for public service channels might be holding up rather well, the 
remit of those channels is increasingly contested, in part because of political pressure, 
but more fundamentally because the increase in channel choice empowers audiences”. 
The question of why PSM are needed for and if there is still a social need regarding 
broadcasting and media services (Jakubowicz, 2010; Raboy, 1996) is recurrently 
presented. The market-liberal discourse is grounded on the idea that PSM are no longer 
needed as they have become outdated. 
Thus, under several recurring wages of criticism, PSM have been struggling to 
maintain relevance in the current media ecology and in political discourses. The debate 
has been heightened in the recent years by the deteriorating State of public finances 
(Lowe and Berg, 2013), especially in countries where external financial aid was called 
for in the wake of the 2007/08 global financial crisis and subsequent Euro-zone crisis. 
 
The Euro-crisis and PSM (Other PSM under austerity: Greece, Cyprus, Ireland) 
Following the global financial crisis of 2007/08, five European countries endured 
financial difficulties leading to an “Euro-crisis”, which resulted in a call for external 
financial assistance. Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain were granted bailout 
deals by a so-called ‘Troika’ of international financial institutions (European Central 
Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund). In return, they 
committed to implement drastic ‘adjustment programmes’, which implied cuts in wages 
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in the public sector, cuts in welfare expenditures and tax increases. In all national 
systems, the funding system for public media was inevitably a critical issue and changes 
were either foreseen or effectively implemented.  
A rescue loan was first offered to Greece in May 2010, under tough conditions, 
to cover its sovereign debt, but, as the ‘Euro-crisis’ spread, the EU was obliged to repeat 
the strategy with other member-States. With each loan, came a memorandum detailing 
the conditions to be met, which fulfilment was monitored by a team of ‘Troika’ 
officials. A single bailout was issued for Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland, but, in the 
midst of a severe political crisis, Greece received a second bailout, in March 2012, 
involving a major ‘haircut’ on foreign private creditors. 
The cuts imposed to the welfare sector impacted public service media in all the 
countries that were bailed out. The PSM most critically affected was the Greek ERT- 
Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation, which was closed down by the Government in June 
2013 under the rationale that public broadcaster was inefficient and overstaffed. While 
some of the claims may had been verifiable, such as the lack of clear public interests 
purposes in programming and wastefulness, this decision was taken without 
consultation and divided public opinion (Iosifidis and Katsirea, 2014). 
In Ireland, the funding mechanisms had been under debate and, in the period of 
the bailout deal, the Programme for Government of the elected government (2011) 
assumed the need to consider alternative methods of collecting payment for PSM. A 
proposed new charge, presented in 2013, was however abandoned. The economic crisis 
led, in the meanwhile, to a 35% drop in advertising, associated with an 11% reduction 
in licence fee income between 2008 and 2015 – a critical combination for a PSM that 
still lacks “a framework of stable and sustainable funding, favourable regulatory 
conditions and political support” (Ramsey, 2018). 
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  The Cypriot PSM, with a dual-funding model (government subsidy and 
advertising income), also faced a wave of criticism following the bailout deal of March 
2013. With the advertising sector breaking down, the public media has been 
increasingly contested in the public sphere. Being involved in the wave of cost-cutting 
reforms imposed by the ‘Troika’, the public broadcaster was confronted with demands 
of more effectiveness and changes in the funding model (Nicoli, 2014).  
 
 Methodology  
Considering the cultural and political relationships and proximities between 
Portugal and Spain, as well as the fact that both countries received international 
financial assistance following the economic and financial crisis of 2007/08, the purpose 
of this article is to comparatively assess the impact of this external aid on the public 
media service. Changes in the funding and governance models in each public media 
service were evaluated in order to examine if this external pressure resulted in similar or 
divergent trends. The period under analysis is 2010-2015, which includes the years of 
external assistance, as well as the previous one (for Portugal) and the following one (for 
both countries). The impact produced in terms of revenues and the following 
adjustments in costs was assessed, as well as the subsequent impact on audience ratings.  
The methodology used is document analysis, namely of the annual reports of the 
public enterprises RTP and RTVE, ratings and legislation. In each annual report, the 
presentation (charts and discourses) of revenues, costs and debts was examined. The 
dispersed secondary data that was collected (such as revenues, costs and ratings) was 
then assembled into charts to allow for a systematic analysis of the temporal evolution. 
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Even though the data pre-existed this study, it did not allow for any kind of query as it 
was not presented in relation to a framework of austerity. 
 Legislation (including the report of the working group appointed by the 
Portuguese minister) was analysed to assess the changes introduced vis-à-vis the current 
framework. A qualitative analysis of news article and discourses at the Parliament, 
regarding public interventions of the public officials responsible for media affairs in the 
period in both countries, was also performed. Search was conducted in online sites of 
newsmedia (such as newspapers and television sites) for the terms ‘public broadcasting 
service’ and its respective name in each country (‘RTP’ and ‘RTVE’), name of 
responsible official, ‘public service’, ‘public television’ and ‘public radio’. The site of 
the national parliament, namely the transcriptions of ministerial hearings, was also 
searched for the name of the minister and for the term public broadcasting service. 
It should be noted that the approach for this analysis considers overt acts of regulation 
and discourses, but also unveils the silences in the governance of PSM (Freedman, 
2010), namely the non-decision making practices and the issues of PSM that were 
overlooked in the period. 
 
PSM in Portugal and Spain – a brief history 
Why comparing Portugal and Spain 
Being part of the same peninsula, the countries are close neighbours sharing important 
flows of people and goods, with deep cultural similarities.  Although they are very 
different in terms of size (Portugal has approximately 10 million inhabitants and Spain 
has 40 million) and in terms of its administrative organization (while Portugal remains a 
centralized republic, Spain has 17 autonomous regions), both countries have been 
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economically and politically close. Spain and Portugal joined the European Economic 
Community at the same time, which thus became the ‘Europe of the Twelve’. Their 
history has many points of contact, which explains similar media experiences. Both are, 
for instance, considered to be a part of the polarized-pluralist model of media systems 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004), along with Italy and Greece. Both countries created their 
public television at the same year (1956), under a dictatorial regime, and have dealt with 
problems of political independence ever since. However, both countries have had 
different funding systems and governance models for the public service media and have 
a different provision of outlets. 
Portugal. Born as Emissora Nacional in 1935, the Portuguese public broadcaster 
launched its first television channel in 1956, under a dictatorial regime, and was kept 
under close control during this period. The Carnation Revolution, in April 1974, and the 
following months (called the “revolutionary period in course”) did not set the public 
broadcaster free from political control. On the contrary, in those agitated times, all 
media were instrumentalized by the different political forces until political stability and 
regular democratic functioning were achieved in the late 70’s. However, public 
television, for the decades to come, was still to be considered a State television, more 
than a public service one, and impartiality was not a value to be pursued (Sousa and 
Santos, 2003). The major challenge to public broadcasting arrived with the 
liberalization of media markets, promoted by the centre-right government, and the entry, 
in 1992, of new players in the television sector. As a result of the break-up of RTP’s 
monopoly, Portuguese people were offered four national free-to-air TV channels: two 
public service channels (RTP 1 and RTP 2) and two commercial channels (SIC and 
TVI). Public television was also offering two regional channels (one to The Azores and 
another one to Madeira) and international channels (RTP International and RTP África). 
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From 1999 on, RTP and other media groups started producing content and running 
thematic cable channels. RTP offered a 24-hour news service and a channel with old 
programmes, which, in December 2016, were made available at the TDT platform as 
free-to-air channels. 
Liberalization hit hard the public broadcaster, which started to lose the 
leadership of prime time TV viewing in Portugal just three years after new commercial 
channel (SIC) started to broadcast. Another problem was the financial situation of the 
public enterprise, which lost in 1992 the license fee and saw its advertising time 
reduced. As a result, it depended heavily on the direct State aids and on financialization. 
Instability was frequent in the following decade and the possible privatization of one the 
channels was a recurrent argument in right-wing political discourse. The license fee was 
reintroduced in 2005, but commercial advertising continued to be limited to 6 minutes 
per hour (half the time permitted to commercial channels) in the first channel and 
prohibited in the second channel. In 2011, RTP launched an online service (RTP-play) 
and has been working on the provision of some historical audio-visual archives through 
streaming. 
 
Spain. The Spanish public radio broadcaster (Radio Nacional de España) was created in 
1937 during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39); and the Spanish public television 
broadcaster (Televisión Española) was created in 1956 under a dictatorial regime. Both 
public services were set up as State monopolies under the 1908 Act providing the 
framework for telegraphy services. The consequences of this political and 
administrative conception were decisive because an administrative concession was 
required to set up any television or radio service (Sinova, 1995), thus leading to the 
politicization of those media. According to Faus Belau (2007: 165-166), this definition 
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was the source not only of personal, business, social and institutional conflicts, but also 
of outrage that silenced some while giving voice to others through concessions for 
broadcasting stations. The author has further asserted that it gave rise to the 
politicization – forced, on occasions – of professionals, broadcasters and companies 
which always culminated in the political manipulation thereof and, consequently, in the 
manipulation of public opinion. It simultaneously curbed freedom of expression and 
entrepreneurship. 
Until 2010, State had the monopoly of television operations, with privates players 
acting only by concession of the State. Neither the liberalising consequences of the 
democratic regime established by the Spanish Constitution of 1978 nor accession to the 
European Economic Community in 1986 managed to effect any earlier change in that 
situation. 
Act 4/1980, of 10 January, on the Radio and Television Statute, adapted radio 
and television broadcasting inherited from the Francoist regime to the new democratic 
regime. The biggest problems stemming from the Statute were dependence on the 
Government and the funding system. As provided for in the Statute, direct State aid and 
advertising income were the sources of funding, as Spain never implemented the 
receiver licence fee.  Direct State aid started being withdrawn in 1984 because 
advertising income was sufficient to fund a public television broadcaster that did not 
have any competitors. However, that situation changed in 1990, when private television 
operators came onto the scene. As noted by Fernández Alonso (2008), RTVE 
systematically resorted to borrowing thanks to the unlimited guarantee provided by the 
State. In 2003, the EU’s competition authorities warned Spain that the guarantee 
exceeded the net costs of the service provided and, therefore, the situation could not 
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continue. Despite that, the cumulative debt of the Spanish public broadcasting 
corporation (Radio Televisión Española - RTVE) exceeded €7.5 billion. 
The necessary and urgent reform came in the guise of Act 17/2006, of 5 June, on State-
owned radio and television. Fernández Alonso et al. (2017: 111) have noted that RTVE 
reached an agreement with the Government and trade unions to implement a financial 
clean-up plan, which the Executive had demanded as a condition for assuming the 
public body’s historic debt. According to the same authors, the plan foresaw a 40% 
reduction in the workforce (it put the number of surplus workers at 4,150). 
Regarding content offerings, the Spanish public television broadcaster 
(Televisión Española - TVE) started with a generalist channel (La 1) and then, in 1966, 
launched a culture- and sport-oriented second channel (La 2). This situation remained 
unchanged until 2005, when digital terrestrial television (DTT) began to be rolled out. It 
was in that year that TVE started broadcasting the 24 horas (continuous news), Clan 
(children’s) and Teledeporte (sports) channels. Internationally, TVE has broadcast the 
TVE Internacional channel since 1989, and Star TVE for Latin America since 2016. 
 
Iberian Public Service Media in austerity times 
Portugal under the troika 
‘Troika’ arrived to Portugal on the 17th of May 2011 (leaving three years later) and 
imposed, as elsewhere, severe cuts in public expenditures and reforms in all public 
sectors. The public service media was not exempted from this process, but the debate 
over the Portuguese PSM exceeded the mere imposition of cuts over expenses. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of governmental acts concerning PSM (own elaboration) 
 
Political discourse about PSM (Privatization and rationalization of resources). 
Following the request for international financial aid in 2011, the prime-minister of 
Portugal, José Sócrates (of the Socialist Party), resigned and legislative elections were 
called. With a Programme for Government advocating the privatization of one channel 
of public broadcasting service, a coalition between the Social-Democrat Party and the 
Conservative Party won the elections. A 26-months period of destabilization and 
uncertainty followed for Portuguese PSM. In public interventions, the minister for 
Media Affairs, Miguel Relvas, consistently portrayed the Portuguese service media as 
inefficient, wasteful and overstaffed. For more than eighteen months, he argued for the 
need to privatize one of the channels, to reduce the money spent by the public enterprise 
and to end the State direct aid. In that period also, the enterprise was prepared for a 
possible buyout and to look more attractive for possible buyers: staff was reduced and 
the debt almost payed for.   
The first measure of the minister was to constitute a working group to “define 
public service media”, integrating scholars (of Media Studies and Public 
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Administration) and media professionals. Not long after, members more prone to defend 
a more traditional public service media model left, in disagreement with was the 
outcome of the report: a recommendation of ‘rationalization’, the shutting down of 
channels and the promotion of the de-institutionalization of PSM. Although the aim of 
the working group was to define PSM, the recommendations (Duque, 2011) were not on 
how to fulfil public interest in terms of remit, programming and content, but rather on 
how to organize the Portuguese public service media in terms of number of channels 
and on the need for a new contractual approach to the delivery of PSB, calling in private 
players. A prevailing concern of the document was the interests of the private media 
market players, namely the possible unfair competition that PSM could represent (thus 
defending, for instance, the end of commercial advertising in PSM). The report 
advocated for the closing down of six of the TV public broadcasting channels (free-to-
air and cable), the end of the radio programming service dedicated to commercial music 
and young audiences, and it was stated in the report that the media regulation agency 
(which is an independent administrative body not related with the public service) should 
be extinct, clearly exceeding its remit. The report perfectly fit the intentions of the 
minister for Media Affairs and in the following months he repeatedly said that one of 
the free-to-air PSB media would be privatized (the question remaining on which one) 
and the political buzz around the issue eventually led to the RTP board of 
administration resigning.  
The uncertainty regarding the future of the PSM ended only in January 2013 
when the Government announced that it would postpone the privatization of one 
broadcasting channel until more favourable market conditions were in place. 
Meanwhile, the funding model of the RTP was established on a dual basis: the fee 
payed by citizens in the electricity bill (an annual amount of 36,25 euros per household 
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in 2018) and commercial advertising. The direct State aid was announced to be over by 
the end of 2013. In April 2013, Miguel Relvas resigned from the Government following 
a scandal regarding his degree obtained in a private university. The new minister 
responsible for the media affairs, Poaires Maduro (a scholar from the European Institute 
University, in Florence), set his priorities in the governance model of RTP and in 
guaranteeing independence to the public body.  
     
Governance model. The concerns over the politicization of the Portuguese PSM and 
over the lack of its independence vis-à-vis the governmental structures have been 
recurrent in the history of the public broadcaster, which never ceased to be seen as an 
instrument of political power  (Lopes and Sousa, 2009; Sousa and Santos, 2003; Sousa 
and Silva, 2009). This condition of the public broadcaster has always been seen as a 
setback to its legitimation in the public sphere and frequently used by opponents to 
PSM as an argument for its dismissal. 
The new minister of Media Affairs was Poiares Maduro, a scholar who had been 
a member of the High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism (which provided 
recommendations on limitations to media freedom arising from political interference 
and limitations to media independence). With this professional background, it should 
come with no surprise that the independence of the public broadcaster was the major 
concern of its mandate as minister, although no measure on that matter had been 
inscribed in the Programme for Government. 
A new governance model for the PSM was presented six months after his taking 
office: the constitution of a General Independent Council (GIC), which would be 
responsible for the nomination of the board of administration of the public enterprise 
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and the establishment of global guidelines. The idea, Poiares Maduro said, was to 
“diminish the risk of RTP’ governmentalization and fight the permanent contamination 
of the political debate about the company, which constrains its own internal 
management” (Observador, 2014). The CGI has six members, two being appointed by 
the Government (under approval of the media regulation agency and of the parliament), 
two appointed by the RTP’ Opinion Council (a consultant body constituted by 
representatives of civil organizations) and the remaining two members being co-opted 
by the first four members. 
With this new governance system decided, a new concession contract was 
signed in March 2015 between the Government and the public enterprise RTP, 
assuming this supervision model, as well as the dual funding model (license fees and 
advertising). Almost four years after the Troika arrived to Portugal, the RTP was finally 
given a defined framework to its activity and stable conditions to be able to make 
previsions in the short and medium term.  
 
Funding model. The new funding model for the Portuguese PSM is constituted by the 
fees paid by households and by commercial revenues (from advertising and 
subscriptions of cable channels). The direct subsidies from the State, which had a more 
or less stable amount of about €120 million per year until 2010, ended in 2013, and 
from 2010 to 2011 they decreased at an accelerated rate. The license fees increased 
between 2010 to 2015, from €109,6 million to €168,3 million. But this increase is far 
from compensating the loss that resulted from the end of State subsidy: between 2010 
and 2015, RTP lost 31% of its total revenues (Figure 2).  
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This loss also resulted from a decrease of 43% of the total commercial revenues 
(advertising and distribution in cable networks). Global advertising revenue was heavily 
reduced in Portugal due to the financial crisis: between 2007 and 2013 (the peak of the 
crisis), the overall budget for advertising in Portugal is estimated to have decreased 
between 46% (Falcão, 2017) and 42% (Cardoso et al., 2016). In 2014, the trend began to 
reverse but, by 2015, figures were still very far from the values of 2007. This situation 
hit the public broadcaster heavily: between 2010 and 2015, RTP lost 61% of its 
advertising revenue. 
 
Figure 2. RTP revenues (Own elaboration with data retrieved from RTP’s annual reports) 
 
The Portuguese PSM has seen the profit of its operation oscillating: until 2013, it 
was positive due to the State subsidies and in 2014 it also beneficiated from the fact that 
the State had assumed the payment of a debt of €445 million. The financial situation of 
the public broadcaster thus suffered a positive impact, as displayed in Figure 3. 
However, this State measure should be understood in the framework of a possible 
privatization and thus resulted from the need to ‘clean up’ the enterprise.      
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Figure 3. RTP financial situation (Own elaboration with data retrieved from RTP’s annual reports) 
The positive figures for RTP operations in the period of austerity (see figure 4) 
should also be read in the light of the adjustments to costs made by the administration. 
Between 2010 and 2015, RTP reduced its costs in 31,6%. The variable most impacted 
by this cut was human resources, with RTP cutting 34% of the budget for wages.  
 
Figure 4. Costs of RTP  (Own elaboration with data retrieved from RTP’s annual reports) 
 
Ratings. Ratings of the Portuguese public broadcaster also suffered a heavy loss in the 
period under analysis. In the prime-time period, RTP lost 40% of its audience (Figure 
5). While it could be argued that this loss is due to changes in the audience behaviour, 
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namely due to the fragmentation of interests, it should be noted that the private 
broadcasters did not see their figures suffering such a dramatic downfall. On the other 
hand, RTP channels, which were second in terms of prime-time leadership (a position 
conquered in 2007, after six years falling behind both commercial channels), fell to the 
fourth place (behind both commercial channels and cable TV channels). 
  
Figure 5. Broadcasting ratings for prime-time of Portuguese television (Own elaboration based on data 
retrieved from Cardoso et al., 2017) 
 
What it also noteworthy is the fact that, prior to the austerity period, RTP 
channels was the ratings’ leader in terms of the global share (Figure 6), a position it had 
regained five years prior to 2010, after more than a decade behind the commercial 
channels. Between 2010 and 2015, those channels lost 46% of their total audience and, 
consequently, also lost the leadership of TV viewing in Portugal. Again, private 
broadcasters did not experience such a fall.  
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Figure 6. Portuguese television global share (Own elaboration with data retrieved from Cardoso et al., 
2017) 
Spain under the ‘Troika’ 
Spain and the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
financial-sector policy conditionality on 20 June 2012. This Memorandum included a 
commitment to external financial assistance provided Spain undertook an exhaustive 
review of the quality of the banking sector’s assets. Over an 18-month period, an EU 
and European Central Bank (ECB) delegation, in cooperation with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), performed regular missions in Spain to supervise 
compliance with the financial assistance programme. The volume of public aid given 
was €41.33 billion, a considerably lower figure than the agreed amount (€100 billion) 
(Banco de España, 2017). Spain is now in the supervision phase following the 
programme, which will come to an end once it has returned 75% of the aid received to 
the ESM: nearly €31 billion (Roig, 2013). By May 2018, Spain had returned more than 
€17.6 billion (Expansión, 2018). 
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Political discourse on PSM. RTVE had already undergone a profound process of reform 
(Act 17/2006 and Act 8/2009) when Spain asked for its bank bailout. The PSM’s 
governance and funding models had been established, but the economic crisis and the 
measures applied by the governing party (the conservative Partido Popular) underscored 
the weaknesses of those models. The Partido Popular won the general elections in 
November 2011 and Mariano Rajoy was appointed Prime Minister. The new 
Government announced that its plan for reform would be guided by austerity, 
transparency, responsibility and democratic regeneration. Two objectives were 
announced for RTVE: the appointment of a new board of administration and a reduction 
in the State contribution towards its funding. RTVE had been without a president since 
July 2011 (the appointments of the Ombudsman and of the Court of Auditors were also 
pending). The Government declared that, in certain cases, such replacements would be 
pending for some time, but that this was not exemplary and should not be allowed to 
happen again. Hence, the Government asserted that the appointment of replacements 
would become a priority task in that period (Gobierno de España. La Moncloa Official 
Website, 2012a).  
Within the political context of austerity, the State’s contribution to RTVE fell by 
€200 million. The Government justified this by saying that the commitment to budget 
cutbacks that it had announced ought to be a good time to increase efficiency in the 
management of PSM (Gobierno de España. La Moncloa Official Website, 2012a). The 
Minister of Treasury, Cristóbal Montoro, was very outspoken about the high salaries of 
TVE’s directors (Europa Press, 2012) and about excessive spending on fiction series. 
Along the lines of public spending rationalisation set out by the Government, several 
months later – before the bank bailout – he Stated that the cost of broadcasting one 
minute of any TVE series was what he needed to cover services that were much more 
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essential. In his view, they were leisure series designed for people to have a good time 
in front of the television, but that such prices could not be paid (El País, 2012). 
 
Governance model. Over the years, Act 4/1980 was shown to encourage considerable 
government interference in the PSM because its Director General had almost complete 
executive power and was appointed directly by the Government (Fernández Alonso and 
Santana Cruz, 2000; Fernández Alonso, 2008). Act 17/2006, of 5 June, on State-owned 
radio and television, made a fundamental change by adopting a parliamentary model. 
RTVE’s entire board of administration had to be appointed by a two-thirds majority of 
the Congress of Deputies and of the Senate. According to Fernández Alonso et al. 
(2017), between 2007 and 2012, the PSM had experienced the longest period of 
independence in its history. Those authors went on to assert that, in terms of its 
newscasts, TVE had regained audience share leadership by 2007 and had won the 
prestigious 2009 TV News Award for the second edition of the news as the world’s best 
newscast.  Likewise, it was the absolute audience share leader for the third consecutive 
year (with 14.5% of the share) (Fernández Alonso et. al, 2017: 106). 
In 2012 (months before the bank bailout), the Spanish Council of Ministers 
approved a Royal Decree-Law that modified RTVE’s administrative regime (Royal 
Decree-Law 15/2012, of 20 April). Three substantial changes were made (Gobierno de 
España. La Moncloa Official Website, 2012b). First, the method of appointing board of 
administration members was amended so that a two-thirds majority would not be 
necessary in either the Congress of Deputies or the Senate. Such a majority would still 
be necessary in the first round of voting but, 24 hours later, a second round of voting 
could be held. In the latter case, an absolute majority (half plus one) would suffice. 
Second, the number of board of administration members was reduced from 12 to 9. And 
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the obligation that two members had to be put forward by national trade unions with a 
presence in RTVE was removed. Third, the president would be the only board of 
administration member who would have fixed remuneration and full-time dedication. 
The rest of the board of administration members would only receive payments for their 
attendance at board sessions and would not be under an obligation of full-time 
dedication. Another important issue is the management model of the regional public 
service television broadcasters. Also in 2012, Act 6/2012 was passed, which allowed the 
regional governments to wholly privatise (which has yet not happened) or entirely 
outsource their audiovisual production. 
The reform of RTVE’s governance model via a Royal Decree-Law was both 
important and controversial. The Government justified the use of a Royal-Decree Law 
owing to the vacancy in the position of president coupled with the urgent need to take 
certain decisions that would be fundamental for the corporation. It claimed that, if it had 
not been used, there would have been a serious risk of not fulfilling the public service 
mission attributed to the RTVE corporation (Gobierno de España. La Moncloa Official 
Website, 2012b). However, the Spanish Constitution envisages the use of a Decree-Law 
for situations of extraordinary and urgent need: it is an exceptional measure that 
represents an encroachment upon the Legislature’s power. The Council of Ministers 
effectively amends a law approved by the Parliament (Fernández Alonso et al., 2017: 
106-107). In such cases, the Congress of Deputies has to ratify the Royal Decree-Law. 
Given that, in 2012, the Partido Popular had an absolute majority in that chamber, the 
ratification did not come up against any obstacles. RTVE’s new president was chosen 
on 28 June 2012. 
With this change, if the Government in power at any given time has an absolute 
majority in the Congress of Deputies, it can exert clear control over appointments to the 
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board of administration. One of the greatest achievements of the 2006 reform, that of 
putting the appointment of the board and control over the PSM in the hands of 
parliament, could therefore be lost. Since 2012, controversies about RTVE’s 
independence and neutrality have been constant.  Albeit beyond the scope of this study, 
it should be noted that this RTVE governance model was again reformed in 2017 by Act 
5/2017 in order to reinstate the independence of the RTVE corporation and pluralism in 
the parliamentary election of its members (Boletín Oficial des Estado, 2017). From the 
title of that Act alone, it is possible to get a sense of the situation that the parliament (in 
which the Partido Popular no longer had an absolute majority) had detected in the PMS. 
Funding model. RTVE’s funding model has been in force since 2010, and is regulated 
by Act 8/2009, of 28 August, on the funding of the RTVE corporation. The most 
noteworthy aspect of this Act is that it definitively and immediately ended the State 
public television’s advertising income, setting new sources of income (figure 7), 
depending State contributions and on market operations. 
 
Figure 7. Sources of income for RTVE 
In the period under analysis, the direct State contribution fell 48.6% between 
2010 and 2015 (see Figure 8). The 2012 cutback was very significant and came in 
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response to the context of economic crisis and austerity measures. On the other hand, 
the contributions made by telecommunications and television operators were lower than 
expected because the advertising income of television operators fell 50% during the 
economic crisis. In addition, these operators used the strategy of taking advantage of the 
loopholes in the law and, through the courts, managed to get a substantial reduction in 
their contributions (Fernández Alonso et al., 2017: 114). RTVE has been receiving 
payment of these contributions with a delay of one year or more compared to what had 
been envisaged in its budget, and this has caused it to have cash flow problems. 
This source of funding has never managed to compensate for the disappearance 
of advertising income (Bustamante and Corredor, 2012; Zallo, 2010). In 2009, the last 
year that commercials were broadcast on RTVE, advertising income was nearly €400 
million. Between 2010 and 2015, the maximum amount received in contributions from 
telecommunications and television operators was €278.7 million. 
 
Figure 8. RTVE income (Own elaboration based on data retrieved from RTVE’s annual reports) 
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Evidence of the fact that this funding system has not succeed is that RTVE made 
a loss every year throughout the 2010-2015 period. The most critical year was 2014. 
RTVE began to feel the effects of three years of cutbacks in State aid and of the 
constant reduction in contributions made by telecommunications and television 
operators. As noted by Fernández Alonso et al. (2017: 118), in the middle of that year, 
the Government made an extraordinary contribution of €130 million and agreed to 
reduce RTVE’s share capital by €388 million. However, it refused to make another 
contribution that RTVE considered necessary for it to be able to meet its commitments 
for that year. Consequently, RTVE’s president resigned in September because he 
considered the situation unsustainable. Finally, across the period studied, RTVE made 
the biggest loss in 2014: more than €134 million. 
Between 2010 and 2015, RTVE registered losses despite the considerable cost-
cutting efforts that PSM had made during that period. Costs were cut by 17.9% in 
programming and by 34.9% in external services. However, staff costs were not cut 
because of the job stability agreements that had been signed by RTVE and its 
employees. It is worth recalling that RTVE’s 2006 financial clean-up plan had led to a 
40% reduction in the workforce prior to the economic crisis.  
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Figure 9. RTVE costs (Own elaboration based on data retrieved from RTVE’s annual reports) 
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Figure 10. Spanish television global share (Own elaboration based on data retrieved from Barlovento 
Comunicación) 
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Portugal than in Spain. Would this then mean that both countries have taken divergent 
paths in what concerns PSM during the adjustment period triggered by the external aid?  
A deeper analysis that takes into account a more comprehensive picture of both 
countries does, however, reveal some common features in both PSM’s evolution during 
the period. Convergent trends between both countries can be identified as follows: 
a) In both, direct subsidies were under “attack” and have been either finished or 
significantly reduced. These changes in the funding model resulted in important 
diminishing revenues, which forced cuts in the service provided; in Portugal, it 
meant dismissals in the work force and in Spain it also meant that the PSM 
experienced losses in its annual operations ; in both countries, there were 
significant cuts in programming expenses and external services. 
b) In both, the image of the PSM portrayed by politicians was one of a wasteful 
and expensive service, as they stressed the need to inject ‘efficiency’ in the 
enterprises responsible for delivering the public service. 
c) In both countries, although it did not consubstantiated in any actual process of 
public alienation, privatization was discussed in what concerns public television 
– in Portugal, related to one of the national television channels, and in Spain, 
related to regional public service television broadcasters. 
d) In both, public service audience ratings suffered heavily during the period; in a 
period of economic restrains and political contention, the legitimacy of the 
public media service was undermined and this was reflected in the loss of 
viewership; in both countries, prior to the external aid television global share 
was led by the public service media, but this position was lost during the 
external aid.   
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What is also evident in the analysis of the period is the policy silence (Freedman, 
2010) concerning the Portuguese and Spanish public service’s remit, and its obligations 
concerning political and cultural content. Even when there was a working group 
commissioned to study the public service remit (in the Portuguese case), the output 
turned out to be an organizational plan to restructure the public enterprise and its 
channels, and not a definition of its role as a social, cultural and political content 
provider. There was little or none public discourse on the type and scope of 
programming, content and news information that public service should broadcast. Cuts 
in programming were made in order to match the percentage of revenues and losses – a 
‘blind’ cut thus (like any other commercial firm would do), regardless of its remit to 
provide quality content. 
In 2012, the Council of Europe approved a recommendation to Member-States 
on public service media governance (CoE,  CM/Rec(2012)1)), advising them to include 
provisions in their regulation for the remit of public service media to enable a “broader 
democratic, social and cultural participation, inter alia, with the help of new interactive 
technologies”. This document did not receive any relevant political attention in Portugal 
or Spain. In a time of new digital challenges, politicians in charge did not show 
significant concern over the transformation this would imply on public service 
provisions. Nor there was any kind of public position on the distinctive role of public 
service media in the consolidation of the Portuguese and Spanish language, through 
their international programming, especially concerning Latin America where there is no 
tradition of public service. 
Lacking other perspectives from public discourses concerning public service, 
citizens’ attention was monopolized by issues of financial and economic efficiency and, 
later (in the Portuguese case), independence from Government. There were no other 
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images of the public service circulating in the public sphere, which shows the 
importance of politicians in shaping public perception of PSM. Clearly, this also served 
the interest of private groups, which beneficiated (as seen by audience figures) from this 
de-legitimizing discourse over public service. 
The public service media was hence considered to be a taxpayer problem, not a 
citizenry issue. It was mostly framed as a service which should prove value for money 
and not as a service to prove value to democracy. Public service was not seen as a 
citizens’ right but a burden to taxpayers that should be alleviated – it was never a right, 
but always a duty. And in countries where citizens were already overcharged with duties 
towards public debt, high tax increases and cuts in health and education systems, this 
kind of framing just led people to discuss the relevance of maintaining what was 
supposed to be a fat and hungry machine that did not produce anything useful.  
So, although being a matter of normative values and interests in behalf of the 
citizens, much of the dispute over PSM is framed by economic and financial 
considerations (Lowe and Berg, 2013: 78). This is clearly what happened in Portugal 
and Spain. With the need to impose cuts in the background, what we have witnessed is 
the establishment of a different vision of what a PSM should be: the idea of a more 
minimalist PSM, one that could not endanger the private media market, one that has 
been too costly to taxpayers and that needs to be resourceful and efficient. Thus, the 
austerity period and of economic contention was an ideal context to set up a neoliberal 
ideological point-of-view regarding the public service media both in Portugal and 
Spain. In Portugal, this was clear in the political discourse and in the advocating for 
privatization. In Spain, this happened by making the public service dependable of 
market revenues.  
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Furthermore, although we can observe formal measures that seem to point out to 
divergent positions assumed by each country, both PSM experienced high instability in 
the period, caused by politicians and by their public discourses and/or actions. This 
shows that, in spite of the measures taken in relation to formal independence (either 
financial or editorial), governments do maintain mechanisms of pressure over the PSM 
operators, which negatively impacts the perceived image of editorial and programming 
independence. 
At the end, in both countries, the provision of PSM in terms of traditional channels 
did not suffer any substantial change, but its image and its influential scope has been 
impaired. Legitimacy is also built in the public sphere and the number of news articles 
and discussion regarding the PSM in both countries has been anything but fair and 
balanced, always stressing over-costs and poor management strategies and never its 
positive impact for society. This also happened because numbers are easy to sort and the 
real impact of PSM in political and cultural democracy is not easily quantified nor has it 
been the subject of a thorough investigation.   
 
Conclusion 
The Eurozone crisis and the following adjustment programmes pressured heavily the 
Public Service Media of the bailed out countries. Demands for efficiency and a 
reduction in funding and revenues were common to all countries affected. Public 
services media in Portugal and Spain exit the austerity era still enduring old fragilities, 
such as their long lasting difficulty in guaranteeing financial and economic 
sustainability. Additionally, they are now facing new challenges: diminishing incomes 
and poor public support, and more importantly, less legitimacy. 
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Less income means that PSM broadcasters had fewer options to fight for quality 
contents, to provide better news services and to position themselves as distinctive 
providers of audiovisual offers. Thus, in face of commercial competition, public service 
operators had fewer opportunities to assume their mission in setting quality standards. 
Their role in promoting cultural identities was also weakened. Consequently, audience 
turned to other options in the audiovisual panorama. 
Political discourse also contributed to the idea that the public service media is 
not an essential asset in political and cultural democracies. By stressing matters of 
efficiency and rationality in resources management, public officials set the discourse at 
the economic and financial level only, leaving aside other important elements of the 
equation, such as content provision (entertainment and news) that do not obey to 
commercial and market imperatives only. 
At the end, the legitimacy and ‘raison d’être’ of public service was undermined. 
By emptying the discussion over the public service media of these structural vectors, the 
very concept of public service was somehow drained. Portuguese and Spanish public 
service media have thus experienced a sort of dismantling, in which money and words 
were the strings pulling down the pieces.  
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